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RELIGION, PUBLIC LAW, AND THE REFUGE OF
FORMALISM
Howard Kislowicz* and Benjamin L. Berger**

In this article we suggest that the encounter with religious legal traditions
has surfaced a distinct vein of formalism in Canadian public law, discernable across
the Court’s law and religion jurisprudence. This is so despite the centrality of
substantive analysis in the account Canadian public law gives of itself. But there
are distinct challenges and a particular anxiety that surrounds the law-religion
encounter; we argue that the fraught sovereignty and pluralism problems that this
encounter presents has led Canadian public law to rediscover its formalist habits
and the comfort that they bring.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Wall and Aga serve as a
springboard for showing how the Court uses formalism in the law and religion
jurisprudence to manage the complexity and risks raised by engagement with
religious difference. Having shown that this move to reach for formalist tools is a
pattern endemic in the encounter between liberal legal orders and religious
pluralism, we explain both the appeal and challenges of this turn to formalism.
We do not offer this as a complete story of the law and religion jurisprudence
in Canada, nor do we intend this as pure critique. Instead, we analyze the character
and habits of Canadian public law by watching how it behaves in relationship with
religion. We suggest that its impulse toward formalism stems from anxiety over its
identity as secular, from its claims to authority, from a respect for the multiple
sources of authority in people’s lives, or some combination of these. This habit may
serve public law well: reinforcing legitimacy and certainty, manifesting a
commitment to secular neutrality, or honouring a complicated past with religion.
The formalist move, however, is always fragile. It suppresses, rather than
addresses, conflict and complexity. Adhering to formalism involves detaching from
forms of justice that turn on context and particularity, precisely where the meaning
of much religious life is found.

1

INTRODUCTION

We discover ourselves through encounter with others.1 We tell various stories about
ourselves, about our essential character or identity, but it is only when we are drawn
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into relationship with another that the adequacy of these accounts is tested. If we are
paying attention, we invariably learn that aspects of our self-accounts include features
that are idealized, incompletely realized, or positively false, and that other important
parts of who we are were less apparent to ourselves.2 In particular, in the most difficult,
complex, and fraught encounters with others it is not necessarily our most valued or
noble traits and habits that emerge, it is, rather, the ones that most serve us.3
In this article we indulge a legal anthropomorphism by following the intuition
that something like this process occurs within legal systems and the development of
public law traditions. We accept the dangers of so doing because of its heuristic upside:
we think that it helps us see something both interesting and true about the encounter
between state law and religious legal traditions, and about contemporary Canadian
public law. There are precedents for this kind of argument in the literature on law and
religion and in constitutional theory. There is Harold Berman’s work, which
demonstrates, in magisterial detail, that state authority learned the shape and character
of a modern legal order from engagement and struggle with religious legal traditions.4
And in the field of constitutional theory, one might think also of Robert Cover.
Following Kenneth Burke’s claim that “Constitutions are agonistic instruments,” in
that “they establish a normative world on the basis of their opposition to other worlds,”5
Cover exposed the violence at the heart of constitutional interpretation.6 Nomos and
Narrative7 was, famously, an application of this insight to the interaction of state public
law and religion.
**
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York University. I wish to express my thanks to Kate Glover Berger, John McCamus, and
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1
On the dialogical nature of identity, see Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in Amy
Gutmann, ed, Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
2
On the deep difficulty of telling these stories about ourselves, see Judith Butler, Giving an
Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005).
3
This is one of the essential insights of the psychoanalytic tradition. See e.g. Adam Phillips,
Terrors and Experts (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996).
4
Harold Joseph Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983). See also Harold Joseph Berman, The
Interaction of Law and Religion (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1974).
5
Cited in Robert M Cover, “The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed,
and the Role” (1985) 20 Ga L Rev 815 at 816.
6
Cover, supra note 5; Robert M Cover, “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95:8 Yale LJ 1601.
7
Robert M Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative”
(1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4.
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Our inquiry is less historical and dramatic than either Berman’s or Cover’s, but
it follows a sympathetic path. We look to two recent cases from the Supreme Court of
Canada, Wall8 and Aga,9 as a springboard or occasion for suggesting that the encounter
with religious legal traditions has surfaced a distinct vein of formalism in Canadian
public law, discernable across the Court’s law and religion jurisprudence. Otherwise
put, one effect on Canadian public law of its interaction with the complexity, challenge,
and unruliness10 of religion has been to rediscover the virtues of, and reengage with,
formalist tools of public law analysis. This is so despite the centrality of substantive
analysis in the account that contemporary Canadian public law gives of itself. This
avowed aversion to formalist analysis is apparent across a variety of areas and doctrines
of constitutional and public law. The symbolic heartland of this commitment to
substantive analysis is, of course, the jurisprudence interpreting the Charter equality
guarantee, in which the embrace of “substantive equality [as] the ‘animating norm’”11
and “philosophical premise”12 of s. 15(1) serves as a near synecdoche for the movement
from pre- to post-Charter public law.13 The (until recent)14 embrace of purposive
interpretation15 is another expression of this commitment to substantive engagement,
as is the (again, until recent)16 general movement away from categorical analysis in the
law governing judicial review of administrative action.17
Further afield, an echo of this substantive posture can be found in the
contemporary law of evidence, which has been defined by the so-called “principled

8

Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall, 2018 SCC 26
[Wall].
9
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St Mary Cathedral v Aga, 2021 SCC 22
[Aga].
10
Benjamin L Berger, “Liberal Constitutionalism and the Unsettling of the Secular” in Rex
Ahdar, ed, Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar,
2018) 198 at 214.
11
Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 at para 42 [Fraser].
12
Ibid at para 40.
13
This is so despite the push-back on substantive equality found in the dissenting judgment of
Brown and Rowe JJ in Fraser.
14
Quebec (Attorney General) v 9147-0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32.
15
See Vanessa MacDonnell, “The Enduring Wisdom of the Purposive Approach to Charter
Interpretation” (2022), online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4032661>.
16
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65.
17
The selection of a standard of review in administrative previously relied on the balancing of
contextual factors rather than the current more categorical approach: Pushpanathan v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
[2008] 1 SCR 190.
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revolution.” This revolution is a response to the “blind and empty formalism”18 of
categorical rules of admissibility, preferring engagement with the contextual
application of the principles and concerns that animate these historical rules. And yet
this example drawn from the law of evidence is instructive (as are, perhaps, the countertrends noted parenthetically above). Even in thrall to this “revolutionary” story, the
virtues of formal categories are never far from mind. So we see in the law of evidence
that when met with particularly knotty problems or deep complexity generated by the
principled approach, the Courts have returned to the shed to recover their formalist
tools.19
We tell a similar story here, one impelled by the distinctive challenges of
encounter with religious legal traditions. The Court has variously described the nature
and source of these challenges. It has emphasized the role that religion plays in the
lives of individuals and communities, noting the connection between religion and
human dignity,20 and its integral link “to one’s self-definition and spiritual
fulfilment.”21 It has traced the “particular challenge”22 that religion poses for law and
the state to the breadth and variety of religious beliefs,23 as well as their legal
inscrutability24 and alleged obstinacy.25 But underlying these practical and conceptual
legal challenges — both real and imagined — are fundamental questions of sovereignty
and pluralism that have defined the interaction of law, religion, and state over the
longue durée.26 We argue here that these abiding sovereignty and pluralism problems
presented by the law-religion encounter has led Canadian public law to rediscover its
formalist habits, and the comfort that they bring.27
18

R v Vetrovec, [1982] 1 SCR 811 at 823.
A telling example is the reintroduction of more categorical, formal analysis into the very
field of evidence law that generated the “blind and empty formalism” critique, the law of
corroboration. See R v Khela, 2009 SCC 4.
20
R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 94.
21
Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, [2004] 2 SCR 551 at para 39 [Amselem].
22
Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at para 36 [Wilson Colony].
23
Ibid: “Much of the regulation of a modern state could be claimed by various individuals to
have a more than trivial impact on a sincerely held religious belief.”
24
Ibid at para 89: “There is no magic barometer to measure the seriousness of a particular limit
on a religious practice. Religion is a matter of faith, intermingled with culture.”
25
Ibid at para 61: “Freedom of religion cases may often present this ‘all or
nothing’ dilemma. Compromising religious beliefs is something adherents may
understandably be unwilling to do.”
26
See e.g. Berger, “Unsettling of the Secular,” supra note 10.
27
Benjamin L Berger tells a different but sympathetic story in “The Virtues of Law in the
Politics of Religious Freedom” (2014) 29:3 JL & Religion 378. He argues that some of the
features of legal processes, including their proceduralism, allow law “to serve as a tool of
19
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In what follows, we bring more precision to how we understand “formalism”
for the purpose of this article (Part 2), then turn to the Wall and Aga cases, drawing out
the formalist moves that, in our view, define these cases (Part 3). We then look to the
law and religion jurisprudence more generally, pointing to various echoes of this use
of formalism to manage the complexity and risks raised by engagement with religious
difference (Part 4). Having made the case that this phenomenon is not idiosyncratic to
Wall and Aga but, rather, a pattern endemic in the encounter between liberal legal
orders and religious pluralism, we seek to explain both the appeal (Part 5) and
challenges (Part 6) presented by this resort to formalist tools.
We do not offer this as a complete, nor even a wholly consistent, story of what
is occurring across the law and religion jurisprudence in Canada. It is one, however,
suggested by this corner of the law and worth thinking with. Nor do we offer this by
way of critique, though the prevailing normative valence of the labels “substantive”
and “formalist” might give that impression to a casual reader. Instead, we are interested
in showing this element of Canadian public law’s “personality,” drawn less to assessing
if it is the right approach to these issues than to understanding how it serves state law.

2

WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT FORMALISM

The charge of formalism is often denigrating28 and can sometimes lack precision. We
want to avoid both these alternatives here. The label “formalism” sometimes describes
the mechanistic application of rules without the consideration of their purposes.29 Other
times self-avowed formalists focus on a rigorous separation of law and politics.30
Though there are echoes of these themes in our use of the term here, we are more
precisely concerned with the generation of legal conclusions through the reliance on
categories rather than a deep engagement with particular facts and contexts. Of course,
categories are unavoidable in legal analysis: one of the virtues of law is that it provides
a mediated, organizing system of ideas through which we can gather greater clarity on
complex matters. In this, categories can play an important role. However, it is always
possible to call on courts to engage in a detailed consideration of facts and context (a
more substantive engagement), or to limit their analysis by recourse to a more
adhesion, rather than ultimate decision, and a temporary relief from the hyper-realism of the
politics of religious difference” (395).
28
Ernest J Weinrib, “Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law” (1988) 97:6 Yale
LJ 949 at 950.
29
See Lawrence B Solum, “The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis,
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights” (2006) 9:1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155.
30
Weinrib, “Legal Formalism”, supra note 28 at 952.

5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4143513

RELIGION, PUBLIC LAW, AND THE REFUGE OF FORMALISM

categorical approach (a more formal analysis). In this latter mode, the finding that an
issue falls into a particular category predisposes or even determines an outcome.
This is the sort of formalism we will examine in this article. Our posture here is
diagnostic, not normative. We seek to uncover and display the way that formalist
patterns appear in Wall and Aga, and then trace the way that this reflects a broader
tendency in Canadian public law’s treatment of religion. As in equality rights,
constitutional interpretation, and the law of evidence, whether formalist tools are
normatively attractive or offensive ultimately turns on understanding the “work” that
they’re doing — that is, the reasons they are appealing and the risks that they present.
That is the purpose of this piece and the diagnostic path begins with Wall and Aga.

3

FORMALISM IN WALL AND AGA

A signal that the Court is headed down a formalist path appears in the way it tells the
story of Wall. The details that courts include or exclude from the narratives they tell
shape the paths of necessary and available reasoning and, with this, the ultimate
conclusions. The story told by the SCC in Wall is notable for its scant detail and
terseness. The Court tells us: “Randy Wall became a member of the Congregation in
1980. He remained a member of the Congregation until he was disfellowshipped by
the Judicial Committee.”31 We learn very little about the circumstances of his
disfellowship. Instead, the Court draws our focus to the formal characteristics of the
congregation:
The Congregation is a voluntary association. It is not incorporated and
has no articles of association or by-laws. It has no statutory foundation.
It does not own property. No member of the Congregation receives any
salary or pecuniary benefit from membership. Congregational activities
and spiritual guidance are provided on a volunteer basis by a group of
elders.32
Compare this with the narrative told by the Alberta Court of Appeal, which held
that the court had jurisdiction to hear the case. In this telling, Mr Wall “was directed
by letter to appear before the Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of
Jehovah’s Witnesses, a four-person committee of elders.” The letter said little other

31
32

Wall, supra note 8 at para 6.
Ibid at para 3.
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than that the “alleged wrongdoing involves drunkenness.”33 Mr. Wall admitted to two
episodes of drunkenness and the associated verbal abuse of his wife. He explained,
however, that “the wrongdoing related to the previous expulsion by the Congregation
of his 15-year old daughter.”34 The church had ordered “that the entire family shun
aspects of their relationship with her,” which “pressured the family to evict their
daughter from the family home.”35 The message of the missing (and perhaps
compelling) details and the focus on legal form in the Supreme Court’s narrative is that
it is more concerned with categories than context in this case.36
The formalism we see in Wall and Aga is an instance of the categorical formalism
described in Part 2. In both cases, the Court draws conclusions from the form of the
organizations before the Court rather than the substance of the dispute between the
parties, with its necessarily religious character. In Wall, what matters is that the
congregation is neither a public body nor an incorporated entity, and thus not subject
to judicial review.37 In Aga, likewise, it matters that the congregation was not
incorporated under any statute,38 so there was no statutory basis upon which the court
could assume jurisdiction. The form of these organizations – unincorporated voluntary
associations – leads the court to determine their legal character and to state that the
legal consequences that follow are generic to any group that has the same form.39 Even
if we have the sense that the disputes are in important ways about religion and religious
communities (more on this in Part 6), this generic logic allows the Court to sidestep
any thorny questions specific to religion-state relations, as the reasoning applies to any
similarly organized groups. The Court need not ask whether the organization’s
leadership is acting on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs, whether interference
with the leadership’s decisions would be inconsistent with the Charter value of
religious freedom or a principle of the “freedom of the church,”40 or whether the
33

Wall v Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2016
ABCA 255 at para 4 [Wall ABCA].
34
Ibid at para 5.
35
Ibid.
36
Admittedly, the factual background in Aga contains more detail, but this is arguably
necessitated by the existence of the Constitution and Bylaw relied on by the expelled members.
37
Wall, supra note 8 at para 22.
38
Aga, supra note 9 at paras 5, 39.
39
Weinrib, “Legal Formalism”, supra note 28 at 959–960.
40
Though the concept of “freedom of the church” has not gained traction yet in Canada, it has
been given extensive elaboration by American legal academics. See e.g. Richard W Garnett,
“‘The Freedom of the Church’: (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense” (2013) 21
J Contemp Legal Issues 33; Ira C Lupu & Robert W Tuttle, “Courts, Clergy, and
Congregations: Disputes between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders Church Autonomy
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expelled parties have some other compelling interest that would justify such
interference.
This formalist logic takes more precise shape in three analytical moves in Wall
and Aga, and these moves more specifically disclose the formalist posture that the
Court assumes in these cases. The first move is the easy disposal of Wall based on its
placement in the public/private divide. The second is the move to determine that, as no
pre-existing legal right existed, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. The third
move arises in Aga, where the court’s analysis of contract law demonstrates the salience
of the category of “religious obligations,” interpreting its presence as a sign that parties
do not intend to create legal relations. We deal with each of these in turn.

3.1 MOVE 1: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE
One of the challenges Mr. Wall faced was the form of litigation he pursued at the Court
of Queen’s Bench. Rather than launching a private action, he applied for judicial
review, a form used when a litigant asks a court to review the decision of a government
actor or delegate. This placed the burden on Mr. Wall to show that his was the right
sort of case for this kind of application. The Supreme Court held that it was not:
“Judicial review is only available where there is an exercise of state authority and where
that exercise is of a sufficiently public character.”41 The Court draws the distinction
between “‘public’ in a generic sense and ‘public’ in a public law sense,” which latter
refers more specifically to “questions about the rule of law and the limits of an
administrative decision maker’s exercise of power… the legality of state decision
making.”42
We do not suggest that the religious congregation in Wall should have been
considered a public body, and therefore subject to judicial review. Indeed, Wall’s
guidance on the scope of availability for judicial review was likely overdue in
administrative law.43 What is telling, however, is the ease with which the Court moves
from “this is not a public body” to “there is no jurisdiction.” The Alberta Court of
Appeal held that “a court has jurisdiction to review the decision of a religious
organization when a breach of the rules of natural justice is alleged.”44 The point here
Conference” (2009) 7:1 Geo JL & Pub Pol’y 119; Douglas Laycock, “Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy” (1981) 81:7 Colum L Rev 1373.
41
Wall, supra note 8 at para 14.
42
Ibid at para 20.
43
See Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority Et Al, [2011] 3 FCR 605 at para 56.
44
Wall ABCA, supra note 33 at para 22.
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is that the decision to disclaim jurisdiction is a choice, but is not explained in this way.
Instead, the Court rests on a stark distinction between public and private, as though
drawing that distinction is simple, wholly effacing the juridical policy choice that lies
at the heart of questions of jurisdiction.
The stability and sharpness of the public/private divide is particularly fraught
in matters involving religion, especially once we start asking about the degree to which
individuals can draw on religious ideas and principles in public decision-making.45 But
even absent religious issues, what qualifies as “public” is not as clear-cut as the Wall
Court makes it seem. As Paul Daly has argued, while statements in Wall may be correct,
“they are unhelpful, question-begging formulations. One is driven to ask: what is the
state?”46 Here, again, we see the kind of formalism identified above. The statement of
the category “public/private” leads inexorably to the conclusion that judicial review is
unavailable, without acknowledging either the complexity of defining what
“sufficiently public” means or the choice inherent in restricting judicial review to
public decisions.47 Though courts source the constitutional authority for their powers
of judicial review in the text of the Constitution,48 it is ultimately the courts themselves
that name the limits of their own jurisdiction. But here, the court does not tell us
precisely why it is choosing to limit its jurisdiction in this way.

3.2 MOVE 2: NO LEGAL RIGHT
Another formalist move we see in Wall and Aga lies in how the Court distinguishes
these cases from previous cases in which it had intervened in the affairs of voluntary
45

See Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, [2002] 4 SCR 710. For scholarly discussion
of this point, see Richard Moon & Benjamin L Berger, “Introduction: Religious Neutrality and
the Exercise of Public Authority” in Benjamin L Berger & Richard Moon, eds, Religion and
the Exercise of Public Authority (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2016) 1. See also
Howard Kislowicz, “Judging Religion and Judges’ Religions” (2018) 33:1 Journal of Law and
Religion 42 for a discussion of the complexities of the influence of religion on judicial
decisions.
46
Paul Daly, “Right and Wrong on the Scope of Judicial Review: Highwood Congregation of
Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v. Wall, 2018 SCC 26”, online: Administrative Law
Matters <https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/06/03/right-and-wrong-onthe-scope-of-judicial-review-highwood-congregation-of-jehovahs-witnesses-judicialcommittee-v-wall-2018-scc-26/> (emphasis in original).
47
As Gerald Heckman et al note, what cases centred on whether a decision is “sufficiently
public... reveal most clearly are policy choices behind technical issues.” Gerald Heckman et al,
Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials, 8th Edition (Toronto, Canada: Emond, 2022)
at 817.
48
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, supra note 17 at para 31.
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associations. The leading case is Lakeside Colony,49 in which the court required a
Hutterite community to observe the rules of natural justice before expelling one of its
members. The Supreme Court held in Wall that Lakeside Colony differed because a
“legal right” was at stake – either a property right of the colony to exclude people from
its land or a contractual right of the member to remain subject to certain conditions.
“Jurisdiction depends on the presence of a legal right which a party seeks to have
vindicated.”50 There is not, according to the SCC, a “free-standing right to procedural
fairness.”51
There is a compelling logic to this argument. It implicitly relies on several
bodies of precedent that establish when the conditions are met for a private law action.
It uses a generic form – the legal right – to assert the court’s independence from the
politics that inhere in the assumption of jurisdiction over religious minority groups.52
The decision not to assume jurisdiction is presented as the inexorable and mechanistic
application of neutral principles (no legal right = no jurisdiction).53 What it does not
mention, however, is that the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, are the very actors
who decide when and whether to recognize a new legal right. Just as the prior move
treated public/private as natural categories, to be discovered, not constructed, by courts,
here the Court treats a “legal right” as something ontologically independent of judicial
decision-making, which of course it is not.
Indeed, there is an interesting slippage in the Wall reasoning, which starts by
saying that private law “claims must be founded on a valid cause of action, for example,
contract, tort or restitution,”54 but later focuses almost exclusively on questions of
property and contract. Similarly, in Aga, the Court notes that the legal rights that can
ground jurisdiction include “rights in property, contract, tort or unjust enrichment…
and statutory causes of action,”55 but the entire analysis is framed by the contractual
argument, due to how the parties argued their cases.56 Jurisdiction based in tort

49

Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v Hofer, [1992] 3 SCR 165.
Wall, supra note 8 at para 24.
51
Ibid at para 25; For a thorough analysis of the difference between jurisidiction and
justiciability in this case, see Kathryn Chan, “Lakeside Colony of Hutterian v Hofer:
Jurisdiction, Justiciability and Religious Law” in Renae Barker, Paul T Babie & Neil Foster,
eds, Law and Religion in the Commonwealth: The Evolution of Case Law (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2022) 211.
52
Weinrib, “Legal Formalism”, supra note 28 at 986.
53
See Frederick Schauer, “Formalism” (1988) 97:4 Yale LJ 509 at 511–513.
54
Wall, supra note 8 at para 13.
55
Aga, supra note 9 at para 29.
56
Ibid at para 32.
50
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disappears from the discussion, but the category reminds us that courts have often
found legal rights to exist even where no property or contract is involved.
Consider, for example, the tort of defamation: the common law has created an
enforceable legal right to be compensated when one’s reputation is damaged by a
published statement.57 Of course, there are many factors to be considered when a
particular action is commenced, but the point for present purposes is that the law has
something to say about how people speak about one another in the absence of a preexisting legal relationship. Courts have deemed the interest individuals have in their
reputation sufficient to ground a legal right. So while we have a legal right not to be
defamed because the precedents say so, those precedents justify the creation of the legal
right by reference to the importance of reputation.
Interestingly, this focus on the importance of the underlying interest seems also
to have motivated the Court in Lakeside: “the question is not so much whether this is a
property right or a contractual right, but whether it is of sufficient importance to deserve
the intervention of the court and whether the remedy sought is susceptible of
enforcement by the court.”58 This is precisely the style of reasoning absent in Wall and
Aga. One might reply that the Lakeside Court merely meant that, from the perspective
of either party, a legal right was in play: the colony’s property right or the member’s
contractual right. This is true, but it does not answer the question of why there is not a
sufficient interest on the facts of Wall or Aga capable of grounding a new legal right
or, in the alternative, why the Court chose to break from its earlier, more substantive
approach. Creating such a right would require extensive justification, but the choice
not to pursue the argument is still a choice. The Alberta Court of Appeal in Wall was
prepared to entertain the argument,59 and the SCC’s explanation for why it was not
rests on a formalist logic: this claim does not belong to a recognized category, so it
cannot proceed.60

3.3 MOVE 3: “NO INTENTION TO CREATE LEGAL RELATIONS”
The third instance of formalism at play in these cases is both somewhat different than
the other two and perhaps the most vivid. In respect of the previous two examples, the
formalist reasoning works by suppressing the salience of religion in the analysis. The

57

For an empirical account of how defamation litigation has shifted over time, see Hilary
Young, “The Canadian Defamation Action: An Empirical Study” (2017) 95:3 Can B Rev 591.
58
Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v Hofer, supra note 49 at 175.
59
Wall, supra note 8 at para 25.
60
Ibid at para 31.
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public/private and legal right categories present the issues as, in essence, not
meaningfully about religion, thereby eliminating the need for substantive wrestling
with the complex and unruly nature of religion and the theological issues and
relationships at work in Wall and Aga. In this final example, an inversion takes place.
Substantive engagement with the particular documents, relationships, and structures of
authority at play in Aga is avoided by emphasizing and exploiting the religious context
— by stressing, without examining, the salience of religion. In this instance, the formal
category that enables the disengagement of secular and religious legal traditions is
“religion” itself. Put briefly, the Court in Aga takes the occasion to generate a new
presumption in the law of contracts: unlike most other forms of agreement, a
“religious” agreement — even in the presence of the other elements of a binding
contract — is presumed not to be contractual and is therefore unenforceable by the
courts.61
As discussed above, the central question in Aga was whether a legal right
existed such that the Court had the jurisdiction over the issues raised, and the Court’s
focus was on whether such a right was generated by the law of contract. Was there a
valid contract in Aga? In answering this question in the negative, the Court might have
had recourse to the rules of offer and acceptance or to the doctrine of consideration, the
essential elements of contract formation.62 Indeed, it seems plausible that, were it
interested solely in dispensing with the case before it, the argument that there was no
offer and acceptance would have had purchase, given that the claimants appeared to
have no knowledge, prior to this dispute, of the constitution that formed the substance
of the alleged contract. Instead, the Court seized on the requirement that parties that
enter into an agreement have the intention to create legal relations — otherwise put, an
expectation that the agreement will be enforceable in the courts.
This doctrine, like offer and acceptance and consideration, is “one of a cluster
of doctrines designed to isolate from the universe of promising behaviour those
promises and agreements that are appropriately subject to legal enforcement.”63 But it
normally operates as a kind of negative category: in respect of commercial
arrangements, it is generally presumed that, with offer, acceptance, and consideration,
61

For an example of a case where a commitment to provide a religious divorce was successfully
transformed into a civil obligation, see Bruker v Marcovitz, [2007] 3 SCR 607; for a compelling
analysis of this case arguing that the conclusion is consistent with Quebec civil law, but also
only part of the picture for religious individuals, see Rosalie Jukier & Shauna Van Praagh,
“Civil Law and Religion in the Supreme Court of Canada: What Should we Get out of Bruker
v. Marcovitz?” (2008) 43 SCLR (2d) 381.
62
See generally John McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020).
63
Ibid at 169.
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there is also an intention that the agreement will be enforceable and a defendant would
have to adduce evidence of the absence of such an intention.64 There are, however,
certain narrow categories of agreement in which the presumption is reversed. The
strongest example is that of agreements made in a family setting:65 in such cases, it is
presumed that the parties to such agreements did not intend to create a legally
enforceable contract and it falls to the plaintiff to provide evidence that legal relations
were intended.
More than concluding that there was no contract in the case before it, the Court
in Aga creates a new and general presumption that agreements made “in the religious
context” — like those made in the context of family relations — are not intended to be
enforceable. Justice Rowe explains that “[t]he local stamp club or bridge night might
have rules, but without more, nobody would suppose that the members intend them to
be legally enforceable.”66 So, too, with religion: “While an objective intention to enter
into legal relations is possible in a religious context,”67 particularly in cases in which
property or employment is at stake,68 “courts should not be too quick to characterize
religious commitments as legally binding”.69 It is reasonably clear that this outcome is
not just a product of the Aga case being about a voluntary association, thereby

64

See e.g. Edwards v Ksyways Ltd, [1964] 1 All ER 494 (QB).
See Balfour v Balfour, [1919] 2 KB 571 (CA).
66
Aga, supra note 9 at para 39. In Richard Moon, “Bruker v Marcovitz: Divorce and the
Marriage of Law and Religion” (2008) 42 SCLR (2d) 37, Moon anticipates this equation of
contracting in the family and religious settings, and the reasoning that motivates it. Canvassing
reasons why courts might be reluctant to enforce religious contracts, he explains, at 46–47, that
“[a] religious contract is based on norms that are often faith-based and deeply held and that
bind the members of the religious community. When entering an agreement or ‘contract’ the
parties may not understand themselves as creating legal obligations. They may consider
themselves bound not by secular law but by the spiritual norms of the community — by higher
law — and by their commitment to each other as members of a spiritual community.” We raise,
below, the question of why we would begin with an assumption that these expectations and
intentions are mutually exclusive.
67
Aga, supra note 9 at para 41. Justice Rowe’s frequent emphasis on the objective nature of
the test (e.g., para 37) might be misleading. It is only if a plaintiff subjectively intended to
create legal relations and thought that was a shared intention, and the defendant contests this,
that one turns to the objective test, namely an assessment of what the conduct of the defendant
would suggest to a reasonable person. In this sense, the subjective intentions of the plaintiff
matter a great deal: if a plaintiff did not subjectively intend that the agreement be enforceable,
they will not prevail, irrespective of what a third party observer might infer from the conduct
of the parties.
68
Ibid at para 39.
69
Ibid at para 42.
65
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applicable to all such associations. It’s the religion that is doing the work here, as the
emphasis in the original makes clear:
becoming a member of a religious voluntary association — and even
agreeing to be bound by certain rules in that religious voluntary
association – does not, without more, evince an objective intention to
enter into a legal contract enforceable by the courts. Members of a
religious voluntary association may undertake religious obligations
without undertaking legal ones.70
Justice Rowe thus creates a new categorical presumption applicable to “agreements
made in a religious context”: such agreements, even in the presence of the other indicia
of legal enforceability, are presumptively not contracts.71
Much of interest is going on here. What, precisely, constitutes a “religious
context,” and one of a sort sufficient to trigger this presumption, is far from clear,
particularly when one considers the many ways in which religion and commerce (the
classic zone of presumptive intention to create legal relations) can intermingle. In this
respect, the Court’s equation of the of religious organizations and their multifaceted
activities with stamp clubs and bridge nights seems willfully jejune. Similarly, Justice
Rowe’s explanation of why this presumption should be installed in the law of contract
— that parties are likely intending to undertake religious obligations rather than legal
ones — is a curious response to the legal pluralism at work here. Why would we not
assume an intention to do both, in the absence of evidence to the contrary? The absence
of detail and the thinness of principled explanation all point to the strength of the pull
to formalism. In the hands of Justice Rowe in Aga, “religious” becomes a formal
category, the function of which is to distance the law of contract (and with it the Courts)
from the domain of religion.72

70

Ibid at para 51.
That this is a genuine presumption is clear from the Court’s observation that, on the record
in Aga, “there is no evidence of an objective intention to enter into legal relations.” This is a
failure to discharge a persuasive burden that is “fatal to the respondents’ claim." (para 52)
72
It is notable that, post-Aga, familial and religious agreements now generate similar
exceptional presumptions. This tracks the traditional liberal treatment of both the family and
religion as quintessentially private domains. See Paul W Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 130; Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion:
Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 277 at 291.
71

14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4143513

UNBLJ (FORTHCOMING)

4

THE FORMALISM OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The Wall and Aga decisions evidence a decided turn to, or re-engagement with,
formalism as a response to public law being called upon to engage with religious legal
traditions. And yet this pattern does not appear “suddenly” from these two cases, vivid
though they make it. Nor is this formalism contained to the distinctive presentation of
the law and religion encounter that Wall and Aga admittedly represent. Rather,
sensitized to this move or tendency by Wall and Aga, we now see it across various, and
central, features of the law and religion jurisprudence in Canada. In this section of the
article, we therefore turn to elements of the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence
that share the formalist features or sensibilities of the sort that we see on display in
Wall and Aga. We identify and discuss three important examples below. The resulting
picture is of the Court consistently, repeatedly reaching toward the formal as a means
of managing the complexity and risks involved in the legal engagement with religion.
This comforting repossession of formalism is one of the notable effects on public law
of its encounter with religion.

4.1 THE SUBJECTIVE SINCERITY TEST
A hallmark of the Canadian approach to the constitutional protection of religious
freedom is the subjective sincerity test adopted by the court in Syndicat Northcrest v
Amselem.73 This aspect of the analysis of s 2(a) holds that, in assessing a claim that the
state has interfered with religious freedom, a court ought not “to rule on the validity or
veracity of any given religious practice or belief, or to choose among various
interpretations of belief.”74 Instead, it limits itself to assessing whether the claimant
“sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with religion”75 (and whether
the state has interfered in the claimant’s ability to act in accordance with that belief in
a more than trivial fashion). This approach to analyzing s 2(a) claims has several
justifications and virtues.76 It is also, effectively, a formalist evasion (or deferral) of
engagement.
73

2004 SCC 47 [Amselem]. For a helpful discussion of Amselem and the subjective sincerity
test — and of much of the historical jurisprudence on freedom of religion — see Richard Moon,
Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014).
74
Amselem, supra note 73 at para 51.
75
Most recently articulated in this way in Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western
University, 2018 SCC 32 at para 63 [TWU (LSBC)].
76
For a helpful discussion, see Lori Beaman, “Is Religious Freedom Impossible in Canada”
(2010) 8(2) Law, Culture and the Humanities 266.
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For Justice Iacobucci, this approach flowed naturally, even necessarily, from the
very nature of the right.77 The subjective sincerity test does, indeed, map the
individualist, autonomy-based understanding of freedom of religion that so defines the
jurisprudence. This approach also effectively removes the risk of having to pronounce
on the “authentic” character or doctrines of a given religion, a danger very much on the
mind of the Court in Amselem, which was being asked to select as between
interpretations of Judaism. Instead, a court need only rule on the effects of state action
on religion as sincerely understood and practiced by the claimant.
But for present purposes it bears noting that these virtues are obtained by resort to
a tool for substantive disengagement from the more unruly and fraught aspects of
religion. It may be somewhat arresting to see the association of “subjectivity” with
“formalism.” One usually thinks of subjectivism as a methodology that requires close
engagement with an individual. But the “subjective sincerity” test ultimately amounts
to a credibility assessment and referring issues to the category of “a matter of
credibility” is one of the great tools of redirection available to the law. Something is a
question of credibility rather than some other kind of question. In the analysis of
religious freedom, the adoption of a subjective sincerity test is the choice to judge
credibility about religion rather than engaging in the risky business of judging religion,
more richly understood. The anxiety about engagement with religion to which the
subjective sincerity test in part responded was overt: “Secular judicial determinations
of theological or religious disputes, or of contentious matters of religious doctrine,
unjustifiably entangle the court in the affairs of religion.”78 Distance from religion is
secured through the particular species of close engagement with the individual required
by a credibility assessment.
In the end, this evasion is not wholly successful and often serves more as a fig
leaf. The nature of the s. 1 analysis means that evaluation of the history, theology, and
spiritual infrastructure of religion is inexorable.79 To assess proportionality, one must
get the measure, somehow, of the substantive effect of a limit on religious freedom.
Subjective sincerity is, however, a tool that, among the many things it does, achieves
at least rhetorical distance from judicial engagement with the most disruptive features
of religious pluralism.
77

He explained the subjective sincerity test as honouring “a personal or subjective conception
of freedom of religion, one that is integrally linked with an individual’s self-definition and
fulfilment and is a function of personal autonomy and choice, elements which undergird the
right” (Amselem, supra note 73 at para 42).
78
Amselem, supra note 73 at para 50.
79
Berger, “Unsettling of the Secular,” supra note 10 at 207.
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4.2 LIMITS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Until recently, the analytical “thinness” of s. 2(a) was a product not only of the
subjective sincerity methodology but the absence of any recognized internal limit to
the scope of freedom of religion. This capaciousness left most of the hard work (and
deeper engagement with religion) to be done at the s. 1 stage. This changed in Ktunaxa
Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations).80 The
Ktunaxa objected to a ski resort development in an area the Ktunaxa call Qat’muk,
known to the state as the Jumbo Valley in British Columbia. They claimed that the
development would cause Grizzly Bear Spirit to leave the territory, thereby seriously
interfering with their religious beliefs and practices. On the strength of the law to that
point, the claim looked promising: there was no real question of the subjective sincerity
of the Ktunaxa81 and, with that accepted, it seemed clear that the approval of this
development would be a more than trivial interference, thereby satisfying the s 2(a) test
and putting the government in the unenviable position of having to justify the limit in
the name of a ski resort. But the disruptive implications of a successful claim for
government use of land, given the close ties between land and Indigenous spirituality,82
were also apparent to all.
The majority’s solution was to reject the s 2(a) claim on the basis of a newly
installed limit within the right: Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rowe explained
that s 2(a) protects freedom to hold and act on religious beliefs, but that “[t]he state’s
duty under s. 2(a) is not to protect the object of beliefs, such as Grizzly Bear Spirit.”83
The Ktunaxa, the majority concludes, remain free to believe what they wish and engage
in such practices as they prefer; that the ski resort might affect the significance and
meaning of those beliefs and actions is not a matter that engages freedom of religion.
This analytic manoeuvre requires delicate ontological work — splitting subject, action,
and object in this fashion — and there is deep awkwardness in the Court using the
occasion of its first analysis of an Indigenous nation’s s 2(a) claim to install a new and
80

2017 SCR 54 [Ktunaxa].
But see Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests Lands and Natural Resource
Operations), [2017] 2 SCR 386 at paras 30, 34-36, in which there is arguably some subtext
casting doubt on the sincerity of the claim.
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John Borrows, “Living Law on a Living Earth: Religion, Law, and the Constitution” in
Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 239.
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Ktunaxa, supra note 80 at para 71. For an extended critique of this development, see Howard
Kislowicz & Senwung Luk, “Recontextualizing Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia: Crown
Land, History and Indigenous Religious Freedom” (2019) 88:1 SCLR (2d) 205.
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17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4143513

RELIGION, PUBLIC LAW, AND THE REFUGE OF FORMALISM

highly specific limit on the right. But for present purposes what is most arresting about
the majority’s decision is the unapologetic embrace of a notably formalist analysis. The
decision expressly carves the “spiritual meaning”84 derived from religious belief and
actions out of the ambit of s 2(a)’s concern.
This is the gravamen of the minority’s objection, penned by Justice Moldaver. To
him, “where a belief or practice is rendered devoid of spiritual significance, there is
obviously an interference with the ability to act in accordance with that religious belief
or practice.”85 Though he would ultimately (and perhaps even more troublingly given
his conclusion on s 2(a)) justify the limit under s 1, he condemns the majority’s
approach as amounting “to protecting empty gestures and hollow rituals”86 — a kind
of “blind and empty formalism,” one might say. Met with a case in which the
complexity and unsettling potential of religious difference was keenly felt, the
majority’s management strategy leaned on a quintessentially formal pattern of
reasoning, carving off meaning and significance in favour of the outward forms of
religious life.
If Ktunaxa offers evidence of formalism in the setting of internal limits on the scope
freedom of religion, Wilson Colony87 suggests similar tendencies in the s 1 assessment
of state-imposed limitations on the right. This expression of the habit takes the form of
the Court’s use of an abstract and substantively thin conception of choice.
The small Hutterite community of Wilson Colony refused, on grounds of
religious freedom, to comply with the Government of Alberta’s universal photograph
requirement for driver’s licences. This objection (which had been accommodated by
the government in the past) flowed from the Hutterites’ interpretation of the Second
Commandment. The subjective sincerity of the religious beliefs and the non-trivial
interference of the photograph requirement was uncontested in the proceedings and the
case focused on whether the government had established a s 1 justification. The
majority of the Supreme Court, in a judgment written by Chief Justice McLachlin,
concluded that it had.
The result in Wilson Colony has been widely critiqued, including on grounds of
being too deferential to the government’s view of whether the small number of
exemptions involved would truly threaten the policy goals of the regulations, and being
insufficiently sensitive to the communal religious life of the members of Wilson
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Ktunaxa, supra note 80 at para 71.
Ibid at para 130.
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Ibid.
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Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 [Wilson Colony].
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Colony, which emphasized self-sufficiency.88 Of central interest in this article is the
majority’s analysis of the deleterious effects of the limit and, in particular, the way in
which it deploys the concept of choice as a means of responding to the complexity and
difficulty of engaging with religion. As she embarks on her s 1 analysis, Chief Justice
McLachlin makes several claims about what makes freedom of religion such a difficult
right. She notes that the potential scope of conflict between religious beliefs and the
regulatory state,89 as well as the high-stakes and (to her mind) often non-negotiable
nature of religious commitments.90 But central to the challenge, she explains, is the
complexity of religious beliefs and practices and the consequential challenge of
gauging the impact of a state measure on religious life:
There is no magic barometer to measure the seriousness of a particular
limit on a religious practice. Religion is a matter of faith, intermingled
with culture. It is individual, yet profoundly communitarian. Some
aspects of a religion, like prayers and the basic sacraments, may be so
sacred that any significant limit verges on forced apostasy. Other
practices may be optional or a matter of personal choice. Between these
two extremes lies a vast array of beliefs and practices, more important to
some adherents than to others.91
Met with this contextual, substantive complexity, what is a court to do? The category
of choice comes in aid and is installed as the litmus test for s 1 analyses of limits of
religious freedom: the ultimate question in the overall balancing stage “is whether the
limit leaves the adherent with a meaningful choice to follow his or her religious beliefs
and practices.”92 Here, Chief Justice McLachlin posits that the community could hire
non-member drivers or otherwise arrange third-party transport. This would impose
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See e.g. Richard Moon, “Accommodation Without Compromise: Comment on Alberta v.
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 SCLR 95; Howard Kislowicz, Richard Haigh
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non-trivial costs on the community, but on the evidence before the Court, she concludes
that “[t]hey do not negate the choice that lies at the heart of freedom of religion.”93
The formal presence of choice is a salve for the complexity of religion. It’s a
stand-in for the “magic barometer” of the Court’s imaginings. In Wilson Colony, resort
to “choice” seems to relieve the Court of closer scrutiny of government purposes and
the scope of possible accommodations, as well as the substantive character of the
choice being offered, as shaped by both broader social facts (like economics and
community relations) and the architecture of the religious beliefs and practices of the
community.
Deployments of simultaneously abstract and muscular conceptions of choice have
been recognized as the enemy of substantive justice in other contexts, from the law
governing police powers94 to the analysis of equality under s 15(1).95 The point is
vividly displayed in Chief Justice McLachlin’s summary of her conclusion on s 1: the
Colony members were not deprived of a meaningful choice to honour their religious
commitments; after all, “[t]he law does not compel the taking of a photo. It merely
provides that a person who wishes to obtain a driver’s licence must permit a photo to
be taken for the photo identification data bank.”96 This style of reasoning seems more
at home in our pre-Charter jurisprudence than anything we would expect in a world of
substantive equality, an observation that points to our final “echo” of the formalism in
Wall and Aga.

4.3 AVOIDANCE OF SECTION 15(1) ANALYSIS
The marginality of s 15(1) in the religious freedom cases is a final and telling reflection
of the formalist tendencies in this arena. Being the symbolic heart of Canadian law’s
commitment to substantive justice, the lack of influence of s 15(1) on the field of law
and religion is revealing. One might begin by pointing to the surprising fact that, despite
the presence of religion as a listed characteristic in s 15(1), there has never been a
Charter religion case decided by the Supreme Court under that section.97 When it is
93
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95
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raised by claimants, the pattern has been to claim that the substance of the s 15(1) claim
added nothing to, or was adequately addressed by, the s 2(a) analysis.98 This means
that, as an empirical matter, courts have not brought the specific tools of s 15 analysis
to the problem of state interactions with religion. One might seek to explain this by
noting the references to s 15 and equality in the foundational s 2(a) case, Big M,99 made
necessary because s 15(1) was not yet in force when Big M worked its way through the
Courts. The thought here would be that the logic of substantive equality has been
meaningfully absorbed into s 2(a). But that seems not to be true.100
In various ways the cases deploy concepts and reasoning in notable tension with
the logic of substantive equality. Indeed, another way of describing the reasoning in
both Ktunaxa and Wilson Colony is that both decisions stand as evidence of the notable
failure of substantive equality thinking to penetrate the borders of freedom of religion.
The characterization of the regulations in Wilson Colony as not compelling the taking
of a photograph, merely requiring one for the purpose of driving, is the kind of formal,
Bliss-like101 analysis of the effects of a law that the Court sought to break from in its
Charter approach to equality. The contemporary s 15(1) analysis insists that an
individual’s treatment and choices before the law are assessed in a contextual, subtle
way that is focused on how, given their “enumerated or analogous” identity
characteristic, state treatment affects their life. Although the extent to which the Court,
in a given decision, gives satisfying effect to this substantive equality commitment is
always up for debate, the presence of that commitment is never really at issue.
The spirit of substantive equality is similarly absent in the Ktunaxa case, with the
new limit imposed by the Court — that s 2(a) does not protect the “object” of one’s
beliefs — presented as though it is an internal limit of universal applicability to all
religions. It is presented as a matter of abstract and structural logic when, in fact, it has
a substantively disparate impact on Indigenous religion and spirituality. Briefly put,
there are no other religious traditions for which the link between this land over which
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2018) 30:2 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law
292.
98
See, eg, Wilson Colony, supra note 87.
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100
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exclusionary messages sent by the practices or legislation at issue, set the s 2(a) jurisprudence
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the State purports to have authority and exercises control is also so intimately linked
with the metaphysical architecture of the religion.102 Justice Moldaver recognizes this
in his separate reasons in Ktunaxa, noting that the majority fails to take into account
the “inextricable link between spirituality and land in Indigenous religious
traditions,”103 having earlier observed that “[t]o ensure that all religions are afforded
the same level of protection under s. 2(a), courts must be alive to the unique
characteristics of each religion, and the distinct ways in which state action may interfere
with that religion’s beliefs or practices.”104 This is an objection in the register of
substantive equality.
Indeed, the very concept in ascendency as the Court’s framework for thinking about
the interaction of law and religion — state neutrality — is in awkward relationship with
substantive notions of equality. As developed in Saguenay,105 the Court describes the
state’s duty of religious neutrality as requiring both that the state “abstain from taking
a position on religious questions”106 and that it be evenhanded as among various
systems of belief and being: “[t]his neutrality requires that the state neither favour nor
hinder any particular belief, and the same holds true for non-belief.”107
Evenhandedness can, of course, take a more formal or substantive character, but the
overall tenor of the cases thus far suggests an approach to neutrality focused on an
assessment of state treatment that leans in the formal direction. When, for example, one
thinks of the appropriate contemporary treatment of Indigenous religion in light of both
the historical use and suppression of religion in service of colonialism, “neutrality”
does not seem to capture what one would ask of the state.108
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There are other examples. The durable reliance on the public/private divide as a
tool for carving up a much more phenomenologically messy world is one.109 Another
is the presumed divisibility of belief and action, identity and behaviour, another
mainstay of s 2(a) analysis that sounds uncomfortably in a substantive equality register
and has been the sustained target of academic critique in other domains.110 The point
is that it would be much more difficult to engage in any of these patterns of analysis,
all of which have a formal character or texture, within a s 15(1) framework. The
avoidance of s 15(1) is thus another finger pointed suggestively to the role of formalism
and formalist tools in public law’s engagement with religious traditions. And this
brings us to the next natural questions: what, precisely, is the appeal of formalism, and
what are its virtues and risks?

5

FORMALISM’S APPEAL IN RESPONSE TO RELIGION

Though, as noted above, the label of formalism is often used pejoratively, we might
hold this normative judgment in abeyance and instead consider what it is about
religious freedom cases that drives the court to adopt a formalist position. In the cases
we have discussed, there is a sense that, while religious practices and differences drove
the disputes, the Court’s response has been to retreat from substantive engagement.
How can we explain the impulse towards a formalist response to state-religion
relations? The Court gives a hint in its finding in Wall that “courts have neither
legitimacy nor institutional capacity to deal with [issues of religious doctrine].”111 In
framing the justiciability question, the Court relies on the writings of Lorne Sossin.
Sossin writes that the questions of legitimacy and institutional capacity are answered
by considering whether
the matter before the court would be an economical and efficient
investment of judicial resources to resolve, [whether] there is a sufficient
factual and evidentiary basis for the claim, [whether] there would be an
adequate adversarial presentation of the parties’ positions and [whether]
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no other administrative or political body has been given prior jurisdiction
of the matter by statute.112
Interestingly, none of these considerations figure in the Wall Court’s analysis. Instead,
it focuses on whether the court will be unjustifiably entangled in religious matters.113
Through this emphasis, the legitimacy/institutional capacity question is tied
directly to the religious elements of the dispute, rather than to a more generic concern
about efficient use of judicial resources or the sufficiency of evidence and argument.
But the Court does not explain precisely what the institutional capacity limitation is,
nor why it would be illegitimate for a court to intervene in these kinds of religious
disputes. We think the institutional capacity question is something of a red herring, or
at least a proxy for a more foundational concern. “Institutional capacity” might refer
simply to knowledge and expertise. There is no institutional requirement for judges in
Canada to have familiarity with any religious tradition, so one might say the court, as
an institution, lacks expertise on these matters. But the same could be said of many
subjects. In Amselem, for example, expert testimony was produced about religious
obligations, but also about architecture and engineering.114 Though the courts have no
institutional expertise in these latter fields, they do not hesitate to select the expert
testimony that is more convincing on these matters.115 We think that the point in Wall
about institutional capacity can therefore be folded into a broader concern about
legitimacy, with “capacity” really standing for a prudential judgment about what a
court ought to be deciding in order to preserve its legitimacy in a particular historical
and political configuration of religion and state.
We can thus get to the heart of the legitimacy question: why would it be
illegitimate for the court to answer questions of religious doctrine, where resolution of
a legal issue in a given case calls upon it to do so? Why is it that courts can be
unjustifiably entangled in religion, but not architecture? While some might point to the
existence of a Charter right of religious freedom to account for the distinction, and that
might have some formal explanatory force, it is also a kind of question-begging. Why
do limits on the scope of legitimate state involvement in religion reflected in s 2(a) bind
the courts’ reasoning, resulting in a similar reticence to engage with religion, even
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when it is faced with matters not subject to the Charter, for example where corporate
or contractual documents refer to religious matters?116
This concern with legitimacy appears sourced in a kind of anxiety. One
dimension of this anxiety is practical: if courts make rulings that an increasing number
of legal subjects and law enforcement agents see as illegitimate, perhaps the people the
court depends upon will stop doing the work of turning judicial words into action.117
In this framing, the main reason courts do not want to involve themselves in religious
disputes is that they sense that people would not abide by their pronouncements, and
perhaps that law enforcement agents may not enforce them. The worry is that a single
instance in which law enforcement refuses to comply could lead to others, and this
might begin to make courts’ claims to authority less credible.
But this anxiety could also be cast in a more inchoate fashion, which is perhaps
how it is felt, even if “subconsciously,” by courts. The history of the development of
modern liberal legal orders is one that has been in conversation and sometimes direct
competition with religious authority.118 That story is not just one of boundary-setting,
but also about mutual influence, as one can see, for example, in the historical impact
of the law of equity on modern common law.119 Yet one moral of the story for modern
secular courts has been that “theological matters" are uniquely dangerous, messy, and
generally inappropriate issues with which to engage.120 The sense is that the public and
secular character of law is threatened by even adjudicative proximity to religion.
Becoming entangled with religious matters — even if those matters are no more
private, complex, or unruly than other issues with which courts habitually deal — thus
presents as a risk it is uniquely important to avoid. Formalism (be it in the ways seen
116
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in Aga and Wall, the subjective sincerity test, or a formal approach to neutrality and
equality) is a technique to achieve distance.
It is possible that this anxiety co-exists with, or could be more positively framed
as, a juridical acknowledgement of legal pluralism and the use of formalist tools to
ensure room for non-state normative and legal orders to operate. Some element of
courts’ desire for distance, expressed through formalism, may flow from a recognition
that citizens see themselves as participating in multiple normative (even legal) orders,
each of which makes claims over how they behave. And in some of its expressions, the
use of formal postures and tools to ensure that law does not “weigh in” on religion
does, indeed, secure forms of religious autonomy and self-direction/self-definition.
This is the effect of the subjective sincerity test, at least before s 1 enters the picture.
One can see this effect in the posture taken in Wall and Aga very clearly, too: in Wall
and Aga, the formalism becomes a “substantive interpretive abstention”121 as religious
norms are non-justiciable. It doesn’t matter what the particular norm is, which
community invokes it, or what its consequences are for members. If no (previously
established) legal rights are affected, the court will not adjudicate, leaving to
community leadership the ability to sort through disagreements.122 In these modes,
formalism can be seen instead as a way to use the language of law to modestly123 limit
the extent of the state’s dominion and respect alternative sources of authority.

6

THE CHALLENGES OF FORMALISM

While formalism holds various forms of appeal, it can also bring with it significant
challenges. At a general level, formalism is designed to remove at least some measure
of discretion from decision-makers (in our case, trial and appellate judges). This can
create inconsistencies in the treatment of substantively similar cases. For instance, there
121
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is a strangeness to how the non-justiciability of religious doctrine works in practice.
Contracts or corporate bylaws that refer to religious sources directly (such as the Book
of Matthew)124 are not justiciable, but those that spell out the same obligations sanitized
of their religious origins would likely be.125 This seems both artificial and fragile: the
enforceability of a contract or corporate bylaw is determined by its technical wording
rather than a larger appreciation of context, allowing parties to do indirectly what they
cannot do directly.
These pretensions and logical frailties can ultimately undermine legitimacy, which
is itself a risk associated with the formalist posture. Formalism can inhibit courts from
making some of their reasons for decision explicit, damaging the transparency that is
essential to structures of legitimacy. In Wall and Aga, for instance, the formal bases for
the rulings in both cases make the religious nature of the organizations involved legally
irrelevant. Yet, in both cases, State-religion relations were a major preoccupation of
the parties before the SCC,126 and it would be hard to believe that that the Court would
have granted leave to appeal for a dispute over a member’s expulsion from a bridge
night, stamp club, or soccer association.127 Further, despite making only oblique
reference to the Charter right or value of religious freedom,128 there are signals in both
decisions that what motivates the decision is a particular sensitivity to courts’ oversight
of religious organizations. Though Wall could have been disposed of on the question
of jurisdiction alone,129 the Court nonetheless offers commentary on the question of the
justiciability of religious matters.130 We see this as well in the special consideration
that the Court gives to religion in Aga in its evaluation of whether the parties had an
intention to create legal relations.131
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There is a sense here that religion is simultaneously of decisive importance and
also not worthy of attention. Though Dane speaks of such “double-coding” as a
virtue,132 it can come to be seen as a poor fit with the “culture of justification”133 that
the Court has encouraged in administrative decision-making and public law more
generally. The risk is that such double-coding might undermine the court’s credibility.
When legal subjects have the sense that cases are actually decided on a basis other than
the rules relied on in the cases, the mismatch of motivations and rules may come to be
seen as a lack of candor.
Ultimately, the foundational concern with a commitment to formalism is that it
can prevent courts from remedying injustices that do not fit the pre-defined categories.
The worry is always that the virtues of formalism are secured in the coin of injustice.
Injustices that are dependent on understanding context and history, or that elude the
categories recognized by law, are left unaddressed. This is the concern that led to the
principled revolution in the law of evidence: that formalism was getting in the way of
principled justice.134 And it is partly for this reason that Canadian jurisdictions have
moved away from the formal requirements of prerogative writs in administrative
law.135 Likewise, all Canadian jurisdictions have adopted the “oppression remedy” into
their business corporation legislation,136 and several into their statutes governing not-
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for-profit entities.137 The oppression remedy allows courts wide discretion to redress
behaviour that is technically valid but oppressive or unfair,138 signalling that meeting
technical requirements is not the same as behaving fairly.139 In our context, this risk of
substantive injustice occasioned by formalism is realized in courts’ tendency to avoid
s 15(1) analysis where religion is concerned, as well as in its adoption of state neutrality
as a governing framework for thinking through the interactions between the state and
religion. And it appears vividly in Ktunaxa, with the adoption of a categorical limit on
religious freedom that excludes central elements of Indigenous spirituality from the
scope of 2(a).

7

CONCLUSION

This article has diagnosed something about the character — the habits of behaviour
and tendencies of thought — of Canadian public law by watching how it behaves in
relationship with religion and religious legal traditions. When confronted with the
often-messy realities of the religious lives of its subjects, it frequently adopts
categorical postures and tools. We have suggested that this impulse might stem from
an anxiety over its identity as secular, its claims to authority, from a respect for the
multiple sources of authority that guide people’s lives, or perhaps some combination
of these. This habit may, thus, serve public law rather well in a variety of ways,
including shoring up legitimacy, encouraging certainty, manifesting a commitment to
secular neutrality, or honouring a complicated past with religion. All of these effects
are ultimately traceable to avoiding the kind of complex entanglement with religion
that a more substantive and evaluative mode of encounter would risk. Reaching for the
formal is a protective and comforting instinct.
The pathologies that can flow from this tendency are also readily identifiable.
The formalist move is always fragile, continuously stumbling on its own artifice. It
suppresses, rather than addresses, conflict and complexity, and as with any pattern of
distancing behaviour, it risks resolving into a kind of alienation, in this case between
subject and legal order. Most immediately concerning, adhering to formalism involves
detaching from forms of justice that turn on context and the particular, which is
137
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precisely where the meaning and significance of so much of religious life is found. We
have seen this danger materialize in cases like Ktunaxa and Wilson Colony.
The pattern here is a characteristic of law, not a domain-specific reaction to
religion: law is constantly positioning itself between the relative virtues and risks of
formal and substantive analysis. As we noted by way of example at the outset of this
piece, we have watched that pattern at work over the last 20 years in the fields of
administrative law and the law of evidence. Our purpose here, provoked by our reaction
to reading Wall and Aga, which ultimately took us to the religion jurisprudence at large,
was to show the particular causes, dangers, and jurisprudential shape that this habit
assumes in the interaction of law and religion. Seeing both this particularity and how
it channels an essential feature of a legal order, in this piece we have sought to facilitate
self-awareness about this tendency in public law’s encounter with religion. Alive to the
propensity, we ought to be monitoring the relative weight of its gifts and harms, hopeful
that the desire for comfort does not overtake the need for true engagement in doing
justice, though our sense is that this may currently be happening.
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